1.1
The Ethno-Cleavage Moreover, Swiss-Germans try to differentiate themselves from Germany.
They fear that certain real (physical, technical and fiscal) and symbolic bor-ders be abolished. The "Francophones", on the contrary, have more sympathy for France; which however is not comparable to a will of identification. One explanation of this is the fact that Swiss-German collective memory is marked by the remembrance of the process of German unification and the two world wars, in particular the second one. "Francophones", for their part, have not been threatened by France since the beginning of the 19th century.
Finally, there is a dialectic link between the growth of the two affirmations.
The more the Swiss-German try to differentiate themselves from the external world, and in particular from the Germans, the more they express themselves in the audio-visual media, in the administration, and sometimes even at university in a dialect that most of the "Francophones" do not understand.
More generally, the question of identity is at the heart of the refusal of a majority of Swiss to integrate the European Economic Area. The EC is often characterized as hegemonic, centralist and bureaucratic, the opposite of the so-called "Swiss values" of neutrality, federalism and democracy.
Moreover, integration in the EC asks of Switzerland to accept the free establishment of all Western Europeans. Therefore, many Swiss fear a "foreign invasion". Membership in the EC Common Agricultural Policy (not in the EEA) could also lead to a collapse of Swiss agriculture, especially in Alpine areas. This study analyzes the validity of the arguments against EC integration and concludes that those "Swiss values" (direct democracy, federalism, neutrality, restrictive immigration and agriculture) will be better defended by joining the EC system rather than by staying outside the Community. This analysis is based on empirical evidence that Switzerland's rejection of the European Economic Area means a mixture of political marginalization, political satellization and economic marginalization. Second, German-speaking Swiss try to differentiate themselves from Germany, to avoid becoming another "Land" and to lose their own identity.
They fear an integration a Community dominated politically by Germany.
The French-speaking Swiss, by contrast, have no fear of the Gallic neighbour.
Third, there is a dialectical link between the rise of the two main ethno-nationalisms. The more the Swiss-Germans try to differentiate from the outside word, and especially from the Germans, the more they speak a non-written dialect at the levels of the mass-media, the university and even the administration. At the same time, the German-speaking Swiss practice less and less the French language as the Anglo-Saxon and German worlds are getting more attractive than France from a cultural point of view. This makes communication difficult with the French-speaking Swiss as most of them ignore this non-written dialect. Therefore, most of the "Romans" cannot communicate with the Swiss-Germans as they do not understand them.
The Question of Identity
Identity is at the heart of the refusal of a majority of Swiss to integrate the European Economic Area. The EC is often characterised as hegemonic, centralist and bureaucratic, the opposite of the so-called "Swiss values" of neutrality, federalism and democracy. Moreover, integration in the EC asks of Switzerland to accept the free establishment of all Western Europeans.
Therefore, many Swiss fear a "foreign invasion". Membership in the EC Common Agricultural Policy (not in the EEA) could also lead to collapse of Swiss agriculture, especially in Alpine areas. Everyone knows that territory is linked to all nationalisms. Switzerland's nationalism is closely related to the mountains and its landscape. Two Swiss symbols should be pointed out : first, the main Swiss place of memory is the Grutli meadow, not a tower, a castle, a cathedral or an arch of triumph. Second, during the Second World War, the army planned to defend only the mountainous part of the country against a German invasion (concept of "national reduit"), not the densely populated urban areas.
To sum-up, the Swiss have developed a myth that they can reconcile free- In the French-speaking part of Switzerland, the European myth is now stronger than the Swiss myth. The "Romands" also cherish notions such as direct democracy, federalism, neutrality. And they can be xenophobic and hostile towards foreigners. In other words, the French-speaking like
Switzerland and still share most of its myths. They do not have the feeling that they have been forced to join this country or that they lost their prerogatives as some French-speaking Canadians and Belgians believe. But the "Romands" suffer to be a minority in Switzerland . Therefore, the EEA, as an incarnation of the European myth, is seen as a way to get out of the " ghetto". For most "Romands", "Europe" means openness, communications with other cultures, respect of minorities. Paradoxically, French-speaking supporters of the Community have cultivated two myths: the Swiss myth of freedom, autonomy, federalism with the "European" myth of freedom, autonomy and federalism. In a sense, the French-speaking "Yes" vote is a conservative revolution.
Erosion of Swiss Identity in the EC

Direct Democracy
For the anti-EEA camp, European integration will lead to damage some Swiss specificities. Thus, through the European Economic Area (EEA), direct democracy will be limited as, de facto, there will not be any possibility to adopt new legislation which does not fit EC directives. Direct democracy means two peculiar features of the Swiss political system: the "referendum" In those conditions, it is doubtful that Switzerland, or any EFTA country linked to the EC through the EEA agreement, could avoid adopting the future EC laws although those countries are non members of the EC. Therefore, practically, the use of the instruments of direct democracy will be limited and this would be especially true in case of Switzerland's membership in the EC.
Many German-speaking Swiss do not want to erode the system of direct democracy as they see it as a deep expression of their sovereignty. In
Switzerland, the population is often called "the sovereign". Moreover, in sparsely populated cantons, (most of them are in located in the Swiss-German part), direct democracy is often linked with the concept of "Landsgemeinde" , a deep mythical component of the Swiss-German identity.
The French-speaking Swiss, a minority, also want to keep the instruments of direct democracy. But they are more aware of the limits left to the population to make a large use of it. It is still cherished but not idolized.
Federalism
Federalism is another important element of the Swiss identity. They also add questions of controls of cars, food, water, air, noise, and so-cial insurance. Anti-EC elements also mention the question of the free access of EFTA and EC citizens to public positions in the cantons . It will therefore be more difficult to derogate to the federal laws influenced by the EC directives. Moreover, anti-EEA people assume that EEA membership will lead automatically to EC membership. Therefore, they criticize a future adoption of the VAT system at EC rates (around 15% for the "normal" rate against 6.2% in Switzerland) which will lead to a diminishing of the cantons' taxation. As a consequence, as the introduction of the VAT will strengthen the federal imposition at the expense of the cantons' imposition, the cantons could lose a part of their fiscal autonomy and be more dependent on the central government, even if there is a financial redistribution . Thus, for
Swiss-German even if there is a financial redistribution. Thus , for
Swiss-German anti-EC lobbies, in a free-border Europe , Switzerland would lose its "raison d'etre" and be dissolved in the Community cocktail . According to some Swiss-Germans, the French-speaking Swiss would join France , the Italian 4s peaking Italy, and the German-speaking would stay alone in Switzerland.
For many German-speaking Swiss, especially in small cantons, federalism is a means to keep the identity of communities jeopardized by the modernization process coming from the central state. Moreover , the concept of double majority in some popular votes (majority of the population and of the cantons) is seen by small cantons (almost all in the German part) as a protection of their specificities. In the French-speaking part, federalism is also seen as being of value. There is however a hope that by joining the EC system , the cantons will be less dependent upon the German-speaking majority and that there will be more possibilities to deal with the French region near the Franco-Swiss border.
Neutrality
For those opposing the EEA, Swiss neutrality is not directly challenged by an EEA membership. But as they assume that an EEA participation will lead automatically to EC membership , they fear that Switzerland's neutrality will be challenged by the EEA eventually (and hence is challenged indirectly).
One should remember that neutrality is not only a strategic, legal, and economic element, it is also in Switzerland an instrument of political integration in a multi-religious and multi-linguistic federal state. Neutrality is often viewed as one of the "deepest expressions of the essence of Switzerland."
The EC jeopardizes the credibility of neutrality. their history teaches then that neutrality is the best way to save their independence, internal equilibrium and prosperity.
Immigration
Politics towards foreigners constitutes another important reason for Swiss desires to remain apart from the EC. The EEA demands indeed a free establishment of persons, free circulation of capital and service, opening of public procurements, mutual recognition of diplomas and university cooperation, all principles which unsettle the traditional Swiss policy towards foreigners.
In the 1970s, series of xenophobic popular initiatives paralyzed the Federal
Council on immigration and to this day, its margin of maneuvre is limited.
In the 1990s, the Swiss fear that their land will be sold off to foreign inves- Policy is seen not only as a material threat but also as a symbolic one for Switzerland's identity.
1.4
Moderation of the EC dangers
Direct democracy
Concerning the instruments of direct democracy, it is important to bring some nuances. First, it will still be possible to use the instruments of referendum and popular initiative for all aspects which are not related to the EC. Moreover, even those that concern the acquis communautaire could be submitted to the popular vote if there is a question of enacting Community laws into the Swiss legal order. Finally, most popular rights in the cantons and communes will not be jeopardized.
More important, a diminution of the possibilities of using the instruments of direct democracy might contribute to diminishing the paralysis of the referenda were organized at the federal level, with many more at the canton's and commune's levels. It is impossible for any citizen, (even for a processor of political science) to have a sufficient level of knowledge to assess each problem. Thanks to EC integration, some restrictions on the possibilities of referenda might make direct democracy more attractive to the population.
Swiss citizens would vote less often but with better knowledge on issues which are closer to their day to day life. They could therefore rediscover the original meaning of direct democracy and vote in a larger number.
Federalism
One should also avoid exaggerations on federalism. For sure, it is true that Switzerland could not remain neutral if the EC was attacked by an aggressive country. But Switzerland could nevertheless maintain its neutrality in case of conflict between its neighbours (i. e. between France and Germany) or between Third World countries. It would not be the same neutrality as today but it could be more than the neutrality of Sweden and Austria. In this situation, Switzerland could appear as more neutral than the other European countries and continue to use this concept for domestic purposes of integration and identification.
Immigration
Dangers of the free establishment of EC and EFTA citizens should also be put in perspective. First, there will not be a foreign invasion when the EEA agreement will come into force. No expect on immigration expects such a phenomenon for the following reasons.
(1) there have no been important migrations in the EC although the princi-ple of free establishment already exists;
(2) the European worker prefers to stay at home unemployed (with indemnities) rather than being confronted with all the psychological, sociological, cultural and linguistic problems linked to immigration; (3) It is mostly the needs and requirements of the country of destination which create migrations.
At the same time, thanks to the principle of free establishment, Swiss citizens will stop their rush for EC nationalities as'they will not be discrimin- Switzerland can safeguard its agriculture only if it specialized in products that its competitors cannot make and finds "niches" in world markets. Today, Swiss cheese represents only 1. 5 % of the whole EC consumption.
Switzerland should therefore develop its specialities. There is still room for Swiss products. Thus, paradoxically, the integration of Swiss agriculture in European agriculture could strengthen Switzerland's identity.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE EEA'S REJECTION
By refusing the EEA, Switzerland chooses a way characterized by three elements: (1) a political marginalization, (2) a political satellization and (3) an economic marginalization.
1 Political Marginalization
Political marginalization means that Switzerland is out of the main elements of EFTA as it does not participate in the EEA. This country stays only in the Secretariat but not in the supranational organization with its common decision-making process, its Court of justice and its "Commission"
(European Surveillance Authority, ESA). Switzerland is therefore a second rank member of EFTA, without any real competence for the important questions of the relations with the EC in non-tariff areas. Moreover, under the EEA agreement, the EFTA countries are to contribute 2 billion ecus between 1993 and 1995 to a fund to help the poorer EC countries. This is their entry ticket into the EC internal market. Switzerland was to pay nearly 30% of this. Now the other EFTA countries have to pay the Swiss share or they will create a crisis with Spain and its EC allies. Symbolically, Switzerland has been forced to give up to Sweden the presidency of EFTA for the first semester of 1993 (similar to the EC presidency's system). Supreme humiliation, Liechtenstein will join the EEA and will be more integrated in EFTA and in EC than Switzerland.
Vis-a-vis the EC, the situation is even worse, as Switzerland cannot negoti- 
A Few Bilateral Agreements
Berne negotiates only a few bilateral agreements, for instance on technological cooperation and exchange of students. Advantages: Brussels could more easily accept this narrow approach and Swiss domestic opposition would not be strong. Difficulties: those agreements will not be enough to offset Switzerland's political and economic marginalization.
Many Bilateral Agreements
Switzerland signs a maximum of bilateral and local agreements. Advantages: this country will avoid important discriminations in such fields as standards, certifications and tests. Difficulties: such a solution could be insufficient, and, above all, Brussels clearly rejects such an option.
An EEA light
Berne negotiates a membership in an EEA light. For instance, Switzerland would obtain an individual opting out instead of the collective opting out foreseen in the EEA treaty. Advantages: Switzerland could then reject future EC directives without having to be confronted to its FETA partners.
Difficulties: there is absolutely no clue that the Community would be ready to grant Switzerland such a preferential treatment. Moreover, the other FETA countries will certainly refuse that Switzerland get a better deal than the one they got.
EEA
A new referendum on EEA membership has been called. This is the idea of a so-called "Committee born on December 7th, 1992 (founded by young people the day after the EEA was first rejected). majority. It means therefore that one needs an important shift of public opinion in some cantons. This will happen only when the Swiss will be concretely aware of the political and economic marginalization of their country.
